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countries' GDP. We conclude that the continuation of the fast growth rate of China, while maintaining
its large current account/GPD surpluses, would be constrained by the limited sustainability of the larger
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1.  Introduction and overview 
 
  The growing globalization of financial markets has led to a burgeoning debate about the 
sustainability and the desirability of global imbalances.  While the rush to reform in the early 1990s was 
propagated by the hope that external financing would alleviate the scarcity of saving in developing 
countries, the record of the last two decades indicates that this has not been the case.  Financial 
globalization has led to deeper financial diversification, a growing importance of foreign direct 
investment, but to no significant increase in the net resources available to finance the growth of 
developing countries.  Intriguingly, faster growing emerging markets, on average, more than self 
financed their growth, running overtime significant current account surpluses.
1  Prime examples of this 
trend are the East Asian emerging markets, where China accelerated its GDP growth from about 7% at 
the end of the 1990s, to more than 10% in recent years, increasing its current account/GDP from about 
2% to about 10% during that period, hoarding most of the recent surpluses in the form of international 
reserves.  The mirror image of the growing current account surplus of China has been the growing 
current account deficit of the US, approaching about 7% of the US GDP in 2005. 
  The above developments have led to contentious discussions regarding the desirability and 
durability of these trends.  The rosy view has been that these patterns reflect the superior capacity of the 
US to provide financial intermediation relative to that of emerging markets, and the viability of 
productive investment opportunities in the US at times when its saving rate has not matched its 
investment demand.  In these circumstances, the high saving rates of China, exceeding its investment 
rates, conveniently finance the US excess demand for funds.
2  A Panglossian view linked the Chinese 
current account surplus and its hoarding of international reserves to China’s desire to promote export led 
growth by undervaluation, where international reserves serve as collateral that secures the continuation 
of FDI inflows. Accordingly, these imbalances reflect the differential comparative advantage of the 
parties involved, and are consistent with an efficient allocation of global savings, where the 
                                                 
1 See Aizenman, Brian and Radziwill (2007); Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007), and Gourinchas and Jeanne 
(2006) for discussions on the association between growth and current account patterns. 
 
2 See Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004a), Cooper (2005), Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) and 
Ju and Wei (2007). 
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globalization of markets generates mutual gains for China, the US, and other involved parties.
3   
  A less buoyant interpretation pointed out that the East Asian saving glut has been partially driven 
by “investment draught” – the sizable drop of investment there in the aftermath of the East Asian Crisis 
of 1997-8.  While these events allowed the US to finance its growing current account deficit at a 
relatively low cost, it put in motion forces that overtime could destabilize the global economy, especially 
if the US would overplay its ability to access cheap global credit.  Accordingly, the sustainability of the 
recent global imbalances is conditional on the willingness of the US to be the “demander of last resort” - 
needed to accommodate the mercantilist drive of China, as well as the willingness of East Asia to hoard 
international reserves and to maintain large net saving positions.
4   
  The purpose of our paper is to point out that, in evaluating the sustainability of recent trends, size 
matters.  A small country embarking on an export led growth, like China in 1980, can sustain it without 
imposing negative ripple effects as long as its relative size remains small.  However, the long run 
success of the Chinese growth strategy put in motion forces that would curtail the sustainability of a 
high GDP growth rate and a large current account surplus path.  By now, China has reached a critical 
mass of “an elephant running in a China store.”  The continuation of the fast growth rate of China, while 
maintaining large current account/GPD surpluses, would be conditional on the sustainability of larger 
current account deficit/GDP of countries that grow at a much slower rate.  We illustrate this point by 
investigating the size distribution and the durability of current account deficits, and by a simulation that 
relies on the adding-up property of current account balances, which, up to statistical discrepancies, 
should sum-up to zero.  We find that, with the exception of the US, the duration of spells of current 
account deficits depend negatively on the relative size of a country, as measured by its GDP/World GDP.  
The simulation suggests that the continuation of the present path of the Chinese GDP growth, exceeding 
10% a year while sustaining a current account/GDP of 10 %, would require large increases in the current 
account/GDP of large players, like the US.  
The above suggests that, short of the emergence of a new demander of last resort, one would 
expect the unwinding of global imbalances in the coming years.  This follows the observation that the 
US is already facing the “stabilization blues.” The housing market weaknesses represent only one 
                                                 
3 For various interpretations of the large hoarding of international reserves and global imbalances see Aizenman 
and Lee (2007a, 2007b), Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2004b), Jeanne and Rancière (2006), and 
Eichengreen and Park (2006). 
 
4 See Roubini (2006), Setser (2006), Edwards (2004, 2005, 2007), Chinn and Ito (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2005) for further discussions on global balance sustainability.     4
indicator that, in due course, will reduce consumption and increase saving, curtailing US current account 
deficits.
 Some of the adjustment has started: the current account deficit of the US peaked at about 7% in 
the last quarter of 2005, approaching now about 5 %.
5 The unwinding of global imbalances may be 
facilitated by a gradual shift of China from export led growth, toward a balanced growth of internal 
demand, a strategy that may be consistent with the continuation of Chinese employment and GDP 
growth [see Feenstra and Hong (2007)].   The unwinding of the current account deficit of the US, the 
growing pressure from Europe and the US regarding the Renminbi appreciation, and the greater tacit 
protection from the EU and the US may provide a further impetus for Asian countries to switch towards 
domestic demand policies.    
        
2.  Implication of global budget constraints 
  A fundamental consequence of the global budget constraint is that, up to statistical discrepancies, 
the sum of all current account surpluses [ . i Cu Ac ] in a common currency adds up to zero: 
 (1)    .0 i
i
Cu Ac = ∑  
  This adding up property may also be expressed as a weighted average of current account/GDP 
ratios -- the current account/GDP of country i [. / ii Cu Ac GDP ] weighted by the global share of the GDP 
of country i ( / ii j
j
sG D P G D P = ∑ ) should add up to zero, where all variables are measured in terms of 
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This adding up condition has an important implication. Suppose that China would keep its high GDP 
growth rate of 10%, while maintaining a current account surplus of 10% for the next twenty years, while 
all GDP of all the other countries’ [AOC] grow at their average growth rate during 1990-2005, at about 
                                                 
5 The speed of this adjustment depends on the lag with which consumers are internalizing changes in their house 
equity and in their financial portfolio valuation.  The growing fiscal uncertainty in the US and the declining 
appetite for US bonds by foreign Central Banks suggests the continuation of the weak dollar until the resolution 
of the underlying uncertainties.  The sub prime crisis also suggests that the alleged superior intermediation 
capacity of the US overstated the evidence.     5
3%.   The global budget constraint implies that this configuration is sustainable only if AOC would 
increase overtime their current account deficit as needed, matching the growing global share of China’s 
current account surplus.  Specifically, denote the AOC and Chinese GDP at time zero by 
,0 AOC GDP and ,0 C GDP , respectively, and the current account/GDP ratio of AOC and China at time t by 
, AOC t cu ,  , Ct cu , respectively.  Under the above assumptions [Chinese and AOC GDP’s growth rates of 
10% and 3%, respectively, China will maintain current account surplus/GDP of 10%], (1) implies that  
 















The current account deficit/GDP of AOC would increase at a rate equal to the difference of China’s and 
AOC’s GDP growth rates (0.1 - 0.03=0.07), and is proportionate to the Chinese current account 
surplus/GDP ratio (0.1) times the initial relative scale of Chinese to AOC’s GDP ( ,0 ,0 / CA O C GDP GDP ).  
Figure 1 projects the future current account deficit/GDP implied by equation (3) under several scenarios 
regarding the behavior of AOC.  The lowest curve corresponds to the case where, with the exception of 
China, all countries will share equally the burden of the adjustment, hence  ,0 ,0 / AOC WORLD GDP GDP  is 
about 0.95 [corresponding to the global GDP share of AOC in 2006, measured in current US dollar].  In 
this scenario, the current account deficit/GDP of AOCs will double in ten years, from about 0.55% to 
about 1.1%.   
  The resultant scenario, however, depends crucially on the relative size of the block of AOC.  To 
grasp the issues at hand, Table 1 summarizes the average patterns of current account balances across 
countries during 1990-2005.
6   Note that about half of the global GDP is produced by countries that run 
average current account deficits exceeding 0.5% during the last fifteen years.  We presume that 
countries that run current account surpluses or small deficits (below 0.5% of their GDP) for prolonged 
periods do it by choice.   Prolonged current account surpluses may reflect a social contract that opposes 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, less than a quarter of all the countries run on average current account surpluses, yet they accounted 
for more than 40% of the global GDP.  The combined GDP share of the countries that run an average current 
account deficit exceeding 2% was about 40% of the global GDP, and their growth rate about 3%.   6
significant net imports, or supports net export positions. In these circumstances, the adjustment to the 
future Chinese current account surplus would be carried by countries whose combined global GDP share 
is about 0.5.  Specifically, note that a generalization of (3) for the case of a large number of countries is  
 
 (4)  ,0 , ,0 0.1 exp(0.1 ) exp( ) 0 Ci t i i
iC
GDP t cu GDP g t
≠
+= ∑ ; 
 
where  i g is the GDP growth rate of country i.  Equation (4) implies that, as long as the countries that run 
current account surpluses are not switching to running deficits, aggregating all the countries that run 
current account deficits into one block would understate the needed adjustment:   
 
 (4’)  ,0 , ,0
,0
0.1 exp(0.1 ) exp( ) 0
i
Ci t i i
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GDP t cu GDP g t
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+< ∑ .   
 
Table 1 indicates that the average growth rate of the block of countries running current account deficits 
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The case where the current account adjustment is done by the AOCD block is portrayed in Figure 1 by 
the bold curve, which understates the needed adjustment of the deficit block.  To start, the average   7
current account/GDP deficit of the AOC block is about 1.1% [where the block is defined by the 
countries that run current prolonged current account deficits, producing about half of the initial global 
GDP].  Accommodating Chinese GDP growth and its current account surpluses of 10% would imply 
that the current account deficit/GDP of the adjusting block will double within ten years, to about 2.2%.
   
Yet, as Table 1 illustrates, the GDP share of the countries that run current account/GDP deficits above 
2% during the last fifteen years was about 0.38, well below the assumed share of 0.5.  If the bulk of the 
needed adjustment will be carried by this smaller block, it would imply that their current account 
deficit/GDP would approach 3% within ten years, as is portrayed by the top curve in Figure 1.   
  To get further insight about key players, we focus now on the distribution of the average current 
account/ World GDP, dubbed “cursize,” of 151 countries during 1990-2005.  Figure 2 provides the 
histogram of “cursize.”  Closer inspection of the histogram indicates pronounced asymmetry in the tails 
of the size distribution.   There are only six countries in the sample whose average current account 
deficit exceeded 0.025% of the global GDP (US, UK, Mexico, Australia, Spain and Brazil).  Out of 
these countries, the US was the dominant “spender of last resort,” being the only country whose cursize 
approached -1% of the global GDP (-0.86% to be precise).  The US current account deficit/World GDP 
dwarfed the deficits of each of the other 5 countries in the group by a factor exceeding 10, and the sum 
of the current account deficits/World GDP of the UK, Mexico, Australia, Spain and Brazil was about 
third of the US (-0.26% versus -0.86%).  For more than half of the sample, 80 countries, their average 
current account deficit/World GDP was smaller than 0.0025%.  The combined current account deficit of 
all these countries was about 0.06%, less than tenth of the US average current account deficit/World 
GDP.   
  On the flip side of the global current account balances, there were 10 countries whose average 
current account surplus exceeded 0.025% of the global GDP.  Japan was the only country whose relative 
current account surplus approached 0.5% of the global GDP (it was 0.4%), followed by China, with a 
relative current account surplus of about fifth of Japan’s (0.085%).
7  These calculations, however, are 
backward-looking, and thereby they tend to understate the future importance of China.  These 
considerations also suggest that the continuation of the recent patterns of the Chinese fast GDP growth 
while running a large current account/GDP surplus depends critically on the willingness of some large 
countries to increase their current account deficit/GDP at a dramatic rate.  Figure 3a plots the association 
between the average annual current account deficit/ WGDP (avgCAs) and the cumulative current 
                                                 
7 The combined sum of the other 8 significant surplus countries was well below that of Japan, totaling 0.35%.     8
account/WGDP during each spell of deficits, Cum.CAs (= avgCAs*length of the deficit spell).  Figure 
3b plots the association between avgCA and  the sum of Cum.CAs.  These graphs are based on the data 
of all current account deficit spells from our sample, 1966-2005 (429 episodes).  Note the unique role of 
the US -- most of the points associated with sizable current cumulative account deficits, exceeding 0.1 % 
of World GDP, were run by the US, accounting for more than half of the global cumulative current 
account deficits.  To gain further insight, we turn now to an empirical analysis of the factors that 
determine the duration of sizable current account deficits.  
 
2.1  Duration analysis of current account deficits 
To start, we assembled the data about the duration of current account deficits of all countries, 
subject to data availability during 1966-2005 (see data appendix for mote details about the sample).  In 
order to verify the degree to which size matters, we constructed a variable “Avg.GDPs,” measuring the 
average ratio of a country’s GDP to world GDP (WGDP) during the current account deficit episode.  
Next, we run life survival regressions (used to account for censoring issues) explaining the duration of 
current account deficits on the relative size of a country.  The results are reported in Table 2.  
Intriguingly, we found that there is a robust negative association between size and the duration of deficits 
for all countries excluding the US, but the association weakens considerably for all countries including 
the US.   These results continue to hold, controlling for the countries’ net external asset position/GDP in 
the starting year of a current account episode [Ini.EWN], and the average growth rate of a country’s real 
GDP (Avg.GDPg).  Interestingly, a higher net external asset position/GDP is associated with shorter 
spells of current account deficits, possibly reflecting self insurance and a more conservative management 
of demand policies.  
 
2.2   Current account size and GDP growth  
Table 3 reports the association between the current account/GDP and economic growth.  
Excluding 5 episodes of small countries experiencing collapsing GDP growth (below – 50%) or very 
large current account deficits (exceeding – 70%), we find a robust positive association between 
economic growth and current account/GDP.
8 Table 4 reports the association between economic growth 
                                                 
8  The exclusion of small outliers is done because these countries are too small to impact the path of global 
imbalances, which is the focus of our interest.  Yet, the pathological patterns of these outliers, some driven by 
wars, are strong enough to impact the significance of some of the coefficients in our regressions. 
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and current account/GDP, reporting a similar positive association.
  These tables validate the finding that 
faster growth is associated, on average, with higher current account/GDP.  The tables also suggest the 
possibility of a two-way feedback between growth and the current account.  As we are not dealing with 
the direction of causality, we focus on the positive implications of these results regarding the 
sustainability of Chinese high growth while maintaining a high current account surplus.  These findings 
reinforce the challenge posed by the growing current account surplus run by high growing countries, as 
they would require overtime higher current account/GDP deficits run by slower growing countries, 
deficits that tend to be unattainable for most.  Thus, short of the emergence of “new demander of last 
resort” replacing the US, the Chinese growth path would be challenged by the limited appetite for 
prolonged current account deficits of most countries.   
    
 
3.  Concluding remarks  
The results reported in the paper are consistent with the notion that, with the exception of the US, 
larger countries run shorter spells of current account deficits.  It suggests that even after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. enjoyed global economic hegemony, enabling it to run large and 
long spells of current account deficits.  Yet, as was frequently suggested by critics of the US policy in 
recent years, the gains from economic hegemony would be eroded if the leading country overplays its 
privileged position.   Arguably, this explained the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and may 
explain the future unwinding of the recent patterns of global imbalances.   10
References  
Aizenman, J., B. Pinto and A Radziwill (2007).  “Sources for financing domestic capital – is foreign saving a 
viable option for developing countries?” Journal of International Money and Finance, September 2007, 
pp. 682-702. 
Aizenman, J.  and J. Lee (2007). “International Reserves: Precautionary versus Mercantilist Views, Theory, and 
Evidence,” Open Economy Review, Vol. 11, pp.191-214. 
Aizenman, J.  and J. Lee (2006). “Financial versus Monetary Mercantilism – Long-run View of Large 
International Reserves Hoarding,” NBER WP # 12718. 
Caballero, R., E, Farhi and P.O. Gourinchas (2006). "An Equilibrium Model of "Global Imbalances" and Low 
Interest Rates", MIT Department of Economics, Working paper: 06-02. 
Chinn, M. D. and H. Ito (2005). “Current Account Balances, Financial Development and Institutions: Assaying 
the World ‘Savings Glut’". NBER Working Paper # 11761. 
Cooper, R. (2005). “Living with Global Imbalances: A Contrarian View”, Policy Briefs in International 
Economics, IIE. November.   
Dooley, M., D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber (2004a). "The revived Bretton Woods system," International 
Journal of Finance & Economics, vol. 9(4), pages 307-313.  
__________________ (2004b). "The cosmic risk: an essay on global imbalances and treasuries," DB report.  
Edwards, S. (2004). “Thirty years of current account imbalances, current account reversals, and sudden stops.” 
IMF Staff Papers Vol. 51, Special Issue, pp. 1-49. 
Edwards S. (2005). “Is the U.S. current account deficit sustainable? And if not, how costly is adjustment likely to 
be?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2005(1), pp: 211–288. 
Edwards S. (2005).  “On Current Account Surpluses and the Correction of Global Imbalances,” NBER Working 
paper 12904.  
Eichengreen, B. and Y. Park (2006), “Global Imbalances: Implications for Emerging Asia and Latin America”. 
Presented at Global Imbalances and Risk Management Has the center become the periphery?, Madrid, 
May.  
Feenstra C. R. and C. Hong (2007), “China's Exports and Employment,” NBER Working paper 13552. 
Gourinchas, P.O. and O. Jeanne. (2006). “Capital Flows to Developing Countries: The Allocation Puzzle,” mimeo, 
UC Berkeley, Department of Economics. 
Jeanne, O. and R., Rancière (2006). “he Optimal Level of International Reserves for Emerging Market Countries: 
Formulas and Applications,” IMF Working Paper 06/229 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
Jeanne, O. (2007). “International Reserves in Emerging Market Countries: Too Much of a Good Thing?” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1. 
Ju J. and S.J. Wei (2007).“Domestic Institutions and the Bypass Effect of Financial Globalization,” NBER 
Working paper 13148.  
Lane, P. and G. M. Milesi-Ferretti (2006). “The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended 
Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities,1970–2004". The Institute of International Integration Studies 
Discussion Paper Series.  
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (2005). “Global exchange rate adjustments and global current account imbalances”. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2005(1), pp: 67–146. 
Prasad, E., Rajan, R. and A. Subramanian. (2007). “Foreign Capital and Economic Growth,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, 1. 
Roubini, N. (2006). “Mind the gap”, Global Economy and International Finance. See 
http://www.rgemonitor.com/blog/roubini/.  
Setser, B. (2006). “Bretton Woods 2: Is it Sustainable?” Paper presented at “Global Imbalances and Risk 
Management Has the center become the periphery?”, Madrid, May.  
  













Projected current account/GDP of AOCs. 
Plotted for the case where  ,, 0.1; log / 0.1; log / 0.03 Cc t A O C t cu d GDP dt d GDP dt == = .  The three curves 
correspond to different assumptions about the relative size of the block of AOC that run current account deficits, 
AOC s  = 0.95, 0.5 and 0.38 from the bottom to the top curve. 
 












































Figure 2  
Cross country patterns of average current account/ World GDP, 1990-2005 
The sample: 151 countries that have at least 9 years data on their cursize during 1990-2005. 
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Figure 3b 
The association between avg annual CA deficit/annual WGDP (avgCAs) and cumulative AvgCAs 
(Cum.CAs=avgCAs*length).  The graphs are based on data of all deficit episodes from our sample, 






The association between avg annual CA deficit/annual WGDP (avgCAs) and sum of the cumulative 
AvgCAs (Cum.CAs=avgCAs*length).  The graphs are based on data of all deficit episodes from our 
sample, 1966-2005, subject to data availability (429 episodes). 
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The association between relative GDP size and the duration of current account deficits 
Source: all current account deficit episodes during 1966-2005 in WDI data. 
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Table 1 
Global Patterns of the average Current account/GDP, GDP growth and relative GDP ratios, 1990-2005 

























<-5%  48  1.112%  2.029%  1.120%  7.20404E+11
<-3%  76  5.676%  2.872%  5.802%  3.32208E+12
<-2.5%  82  37.999%  2.971%  38.386%  1.81071E+13
<-2%  89  38.716%  2.981%  39.193%  1.85331E+13
<-1.5%  96  44.527%  2.951%  44.993%  2.16495E+13
<-1%  100  47.546%  2.933%  47.583%  2.30405E+13
<-0.5%  107  50.344%  3.038%  50.872%  2.44019E+13
<0%  111  53.116%  3.026%  53.693%  2.5973E+13
>0%  34  43.042%  2.439%  40.919%  1.97033E+13
All  145  96.158%  2.763%  94.612%  4.56763E+13
Data source: WDI, include countries that have data more than 10 years.  
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Table 2  Regression analysis of current account durability and size 
dependent variable : Length of current account deficit spell 
Parameter  (1)    (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
Intercept  2.64
***   2 . 6 9
*** 2 . 3 5
*** 2 . 4 2
***    2.79
*** 2 . 8 0
*** 
  (0.08)    (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.14)    (0.10)  (0.10) 
               
avgGDPs  -3.01
*    -16.45
*** -2.01  -13.27
***   0.08  -10.55
*
  (1.74)    (4.31)  (1.78)  (4.63)    (2.13)  (5.49) 
               
ini.EWN        -0.52
*** -0.44
**      
        (0.20)  (0.20)       
               
avgGDPg        2.11  2.12       
        (2.97)  (3.01)       
               
avgGDPpc              -0.33
*** 0 . 2 7
** 
              (0.12)  (0.12) 
               
With US data  yes    no  yes  no    yes  no 
No.of Censored   202    201  140  139    200  199 
No.of obs  429    425  329  325    425  421 
log likelihood  -547    -538  -433  -425    -540  -532 
                     
* Notes: numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, 
** and 
*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significant level respectively. 













= − t WGDP
t i GDP
average avgGDPs endyear startyear
,
 
Avg.GDPg  measure the average growth rate of country’s real GDP (constant 2000 US$) during the episode. Where GDP 
growth rate is measured by ln(GDPi+1)-ln(GDPi) 
 
Ini.EWN  gives the EWN position (to its GDP) in the starting year of the episode.  
 
AvgGDPpc  measure the average level of per capita GDP (unit in 10,000 US$, 2000 constant price).    16
Table 3  The association between current account and economic growth 
 
Dependent Var: CA ratio    (1)  (2) 
  (3) 
  (4) 





***    -0.055
***
Intercept 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)    (0.002)





**    0.083
***
GDP growth rate 
  (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.035)    (0.027)
              
    0.030
*** 0.024
*** 0.030
***    0.032
***
GDP per capita 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002)
              
Data start from    1990  1990  1990  1990    1970 
has population small countries    yes  yes  yes  no    no 
has GDP size small countries    yes  yes  no  yes    no 
# of obs     2300  2286  1732  2023    4064 
R square    0.0026  0.0951  0.092  0.106    0.0847 
                
Note: 1.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors in OLS regression. 
*, 
** and 
*** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% 
significant level respectively.  
2.  GDP per capita is measured by 10,000 US dollar (base year=2000) 
3.  Small countries means population smaller than 0.5 million or GDP size is smaller than 0.01% of WGDP. 
4.  All regressions exclude 5 outliers associated with small countries, whose current account/GDP was below        
– 70%, or GDP growth rate was below – 50% (Kuwait 1991, Equatorial Guinea 1995, 1996;  Rwanda 1994, 
and Kiribati 1980) 
 
Table 4  The association between economic growth and current account 
 
Dependent Var: GDP growth    (1)  (2) 
  (3) 
  (4) 






***    0.036
***
Intercept 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001)





**    0.029
***
CA ratio 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)    (0.009)
             
    -0.003
** -0.003
*** -0.003
***    -0.002
**
GDP per capita 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001)
              
Data start from    1990  1990  1990  1990    1970 
has population small countries    yes  yes  yes  no    yes 
has GDP size small countries    yes  yes  no  yes    yes 
# of obs     2300  2286  1732  2023    4064 
R square    0.0026  0.0048  0.0063  0.0044    0.0029 
                
Note: same as table 3.  17
Data Appendix 
 


















# of countries in sample  175  168  148  22  38  40 
#  of  episode  824 443  381  134 185 160 
# of episode be censored  324  211  113  43  42  55 
earliest start year  1966  1966  1967  1966  1966  1974 
length of episode  mean   5.154  6.941 3.076 5.341 4.978 4.725 
  max 33 33  25  33 33 28 
GDP ratio to WGDP   mean   0.008  0.007  0.009  0.030   0.024  0.001 
  max 0.305 0.303  0.305  0.305    0.303 0.015 
 min  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001    0.000  0.000 
avg GDP growth  mean   0.032  0.032 0.031 0.028    0.033  0.027 
 max  0.302  0.146 0.302 0.089    0.136  0.302 
 min  -0.355  -0.126 -0.355 -0.121    -0.036  -0.184 
CA ratio to GDP_i *  mean   -0.014 -0.062  0.043  -0.008   -0.009 -0.021 
 max  0.434 0.000  0.434  0.062   0.384 0.285 
 min  -0.695 -0.695  0.000  -0.071   -0.240 -0.311 
CA ratio to WGDP  mean   0.0000 -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0002    0.0001  0.0000 
 max  0.0040 0.0000  0.0040  0.0015   0.0040 0.0002 
 min  -0.0095 -0.0095  0.0000  -0.0095   -0.0095 -0.0002 
Ini EWN position **  mean   -0.286 -0.277  -0.241  -0.264    0.040 -0.598 
(net asset/GDP)  max  5.497 5.497  2.829  0.250   5.497 0.102 
 min  -2.922 -2.922  -2.153  -0.875   -1.095  -2.097 
avg EWN position **  mean   -0.310 -0.371  -0.296  -0.284    0.023 -0.646 
(net asset/GDP)  max  3.970 3.970  2.007  0.143   3.970 0.102 
 min  -3.134 -3.134  -2.153  -0.804   -1.074  -2.339 
avg Per capita GDP   mean   0.5215 0.47313  0.5774  0.9244    1.5464  0.0374 
(10,000 US$)  max  4.4482 3.3497  4.4482  3.2731   3.3871 0.0932 
   min  0.0101 0.0101  0.0109  0.0215   0.2934 0.0101 
 
Note: * exclude Kwuit 1991 episode which have value -121.381%     
** EWN is the ratio of net external assets relative to GDP 
*** Definition of high and low income countries are the same as those in WDI. 
Data sources: current account and GDP data are from WDI, EWN data are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s online data 
on external wealth of nations (http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/pages/people/planedata.php)  
 